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Introduction: Setting a Precedent for
Regional Revolution: The West Florida Revolt
Considered
by Samuel C. Hyde, Jr.
n the course of its historical development, Florida has
endured shifting and contested lines of demarcation. Few
casual observers and likely a large percentage of the recent
transplants to the Sunshine State, realize that Florida's borders
once extended far beyond the current confines of the state.
Many students of history are surprised to learn that Florida once
included a significant portion of Louisiana. On the eve of the
bicentennial of the Louisiana Purchase in 2003, scholars were
hard pressed to explain to a skeptical public that all of the Bayou
State was not a part of the Purchase. Despite President Thomas
Jefferson's instructions, his negotiating agents failed to secure the
territory situated between the Mississippi and Pearl rivers - the
"toe" of Louisiana. It would take a little known armed insurrection,
ironically referred to as the West Florida Revolt, to complete the
current configuration of Louisiana.
Arguably the most strategically important territory in the entire
region, "West Florida" as Louisiana's Florida Parishes were then
known, enjoyed an extremely colorful, and convoluted, pattern of
development. One of the only known territories within the modern
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United States that witnessed governance by each of the major
European powers that intruded into the North American wilderness,
the inhabitants found stability extremely elusive. Successive periods
of governance by France, Britain, and Spain contributed to a chaotic
cauldron of divided loyalties, overlapping land claims, and differing
perspectives on the nature and purpose of government. 1
The various colonial administrations differed significantly
in their commitment to and vision for West Florida. Other than
establishing some rudimentary trade networks with the local Native
American population, the original French claimants of the territory
invested few resources in regional development. Mter being lost to
Britain in 1763 as a result of the treaty concluding the French and
Indian War, the first substantive efforts at development of the region
were formulated. British initiatives were just gaining momentum
when the American Revolution offered an unprecedented challenge
to their colonial authority. In support of the American rebels, the
Spanish governor at New Orleans, Bernardo de Galvez, launched
a 1779 military campaign that "liberated" the territory from British
authority adding it to the dominions of Spain. It is the Spanish period
that contributed the most to defining an identity in West Florida. 2
While Spain savored the ejection of rival Britain from the Gulf
Coast, the limited resources and absence of precious metals in
the territory rendered the region little more than a buffer zone
against the encroaching Americans. Spain, accordingly, devoted
only limited resources to maintaining the territory which in
itself did much to define regional identity. The only significant
Spanish garrison remained at Pensacola with a smaller posting
at Mobile, both of which remained painfully distant from the
woefully inadequate garrison on the Mississippi River at Baton
Rouge. Typically manned by no more than 28 to 30 soldiers, the
fortification at Baton Rouge revealed Spain's imperial weakness
in the region. Other than a half dozen soldiers stationed at the
town of St. Francisville just below the 31 sl parallel border with the
1.

For descriptions of the chaotic pattern of development see, Samuel C. Hyde,
Pistols and Politics: The Dilemma of Democracy in Louisiana's Florida Parishes,
1810-1899 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996) ; Alvin L.
Bertrand, The Many Louisianas: Rural Social Areas and Cultural Islands (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1955).
Robin Fabel, The Economy of British West Florida, 1763-1783 (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1988); KingS. Robinson, "Sustaining the Glory:
Spain's Melting Pot Army in the Lower Mississippi Valley 1779-1781," Southeast
Louisiana Review, I (Fall 2008), 5-23.
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East and West Florida. Map provided by the Edwin Davis Collection, the Center for
Southeast Louisiana Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University.

neighboring Mississippi Territory, and an equally small contingent
occasionally stationed at the key port village of Springfield near
Lake Maurepas, Spain projected little power and offered even less
protection to regional residents. 3
Spain's hold on the territory and the unwillingness, or inability,
to offer assertive legal authority rendered the area ripe for turmoil.
The discontent of long abused Native Americans occasionally
flared into violence as did the transgressions of vagrants who
entered and exited the territory virtually unmolested. The absence
of territorial stability and effective governance made the region a
veritable magnet for deserters and desperadoes eager to reside in a
region practically devoid of the rule of law. 4
As Spain succumbed to the power of Napoleonic expansion,
the Louisiana Territory was retroceded to the French who in 1803
3.

4.

For discussion of Spanish colonial authority in the area see, Isaac J Cox, The
West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813: A Study in American Diplomacy (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1918) ; Stanley C. Arthur, The Story of the West Florida
Rebellion (St. Francisville, LA: The St. Francisville Democrat, 1935). For
a broader discussion of Spanish colonial rule in Louisiana see, Gilbert C.
Din, The Spanish Presence in Louisiana, 1763-1803 (Lafayette, LA., Center for
Louisiana Studies, 1996).
H yde, Pistols and Politics, 19-20.
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promptly offered it for sale to the United States. Though the North
Americans secured the vast territory included in the Louisiana
Purchase, they failed to obtain West Florida which remained under
the authority of Spain.
The omission of West Florida, or more specifically that region
between the Pearl and Mississippi rivers, from the Louisiana
Purchase stimulated intense maneuvering in the territory. Amid
the intrigues of French, British, and American agents, three distinct
factions emerged among the regional residents. The first group, best
known as the American faction, clearly resented the exclusion of the
territory from the Louisiana Purchase. This group, concentrated in
the more affluent Feliciana district and in the environs neighboring
Baton Rouge, openly advocated annexation by the United States. 5
Spanish loyalists constituted the second group. Residents allied
with this faction typically enjoyed lucrative Spanish land grants
that would be jeopardized by American annexation. These people
likewise enjoyed the relative tax free existence proffered by the
Spanish as well as the absence of burdens normal to citizenship,
such as jury duty and political participation, which the Americans
were certain to expect. Perhaps most significant, the limits of
Spanish authority allowed residents to live largely unmolested by
interference from government, a quality fondly embraced by many
fiercely independent residents of West Florida. Spanish loyalists
were concentrated primarily in the western piney woods region of
the territory and included substantive majorities of the population
along the Natalbany, Tangipahoa, and Tchefuncte river regions.
This area of West Florida served as home to many former British
loyalists who, facing persecution along the eastern seaboard in the
aftermath of the American Revolution, had migrated to the territory
specifically because it was not controlled by the Americans. 6

5.

New England Palladium, September 18, 1804; Cox, The West Florida Controversy,

6.

William Cooper to Vincente Folch, September 12, 1810, and unsigned, undated
official Spanish report noting Spanish loyalists in the Natalbany River region ,
in Papales de Cuba, Legajo 1568 B, Letters No. 982 and 735, in the West Florida
Collection, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as LOC); Sheperd Brown to
Vincente Folch, September 28, 1810, copy in West Florida Collection, Center
for Southeast Louisiana Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University (hereafter
cited as SLU); Sam Baldwin to Philemon Thomas, October 12, 1810, Elizabeth
K Dart Collection, Mss. 5023, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Collection,
Louisiana State University (hereafter cited as LLMVC); Cox, The West Florida
Controversy, 412; Hyde, Pistols and Politics, 12-13, 18-22.

152-67.
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The final group may be best known as the Independents. This
faction cautiously flirted with the possibilities that could arise from
the creation of an independent nation. Many among this group,
such as the notorious Kemper brothers, had issues with the Spanish
but likewise remained suspicious of the Americans. If viable, an
independent nation could offer abundant land and political
possibilities while also serving as a bargaining chip in negotiations
with foreign powers in the eyes of would be deal makers. This
group included many of the best known political chameleons of
the Revolt and their adherents could be found across the territory. 7
It is amid such high stakes posturing that the West Florida
Revolt erupted in the fall of 1810. This volume of the Florida
Historical Quarterly is designed to offer fresh interpretations from
a variety of perspectives on the emergence of the short lived,
original Lone Star Republic and its legacy. It is structured to offer
consideration of the Revolt as it affected the immediate region,
surrounding territories, and American foreign policy. In short, its
purpose is to offer a comprehensive assessment of the implications
the West Florida Revolt carried for affected players and regions of
North America that serves both as a useful tool for scholars while
also providing an enlightening read for the general public. 8
Definitions prove critical to understanding the course of
events connected to the Revolt and, accordingly, they serve as a
primary focus of Jim Cusick's lead article. While the region on
the eve of the Revolt has long been considered a frontier, Cusick
argues instead that West Florida is more appropriately viewed as a
borderland subject due to the peculiar circumstances that make
such regions distinctive. In so arguing, Cusick finds a logical
connection between events in West Florida and the instability
7.

8.

Frederick Kimball to Dear Nephew, August 15, 1806, and Kimball to Dear
Friends, March 5, 1811, in Frederick Kimball Letters, LLMVC. For an animated
discussion of the Kempers from the perspective of a journalist see, Arthur, The
Story of the West Florida Rebellion.
Existing literature detailing events connected to the West Florida Revolt
include, Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion; Cox, The West Florida
Controversy; William C. Davis, The Rogue Republic: How Would-be Patriots Waged the
Shortest Revolution in American History (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,
2011); F. Andrew McMichael, Atlantic Layalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida
1785-1810 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008); David A. Bice, The Original
Lone Star Republic: Scoundrels, Statesmen, and Schemers of the 1810 West Florida
Rebellion (Clanton, AL.: Heritage Publishing Consultants, 2004); Samuel C.
H yde, Jr., "Consolidating the Revolution: Factionalism and Finesse in the West
Florida Revolt, 1810," Louisiana History, LI, no. 3 (Summer, 2010).
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that characterized development in East Florida. The similarities
in development between East and West Florida help explain why
certain aspects of society, such as political inclinations and patterns
of violence, render the modern Florida Parishes of Louisiana
seemingly more akin to current north Florida rather than the
remainder of Louisiana.
A very different perspective on developments in West Florida
emanated from Washington D. C. where the Madison administration
flirted with a U.S. claim on the territory resulting from the
Louisiana Purchase. Possession it is said remains 9 I 10 of the law and
however tenuous its hold, Spain clearly retained possession of the
territory. The West Florida Revolt changed all that and President
James Madison worried that the infant nation could fall under
the control of a hostile foreign power, most notably Britain. In his
contribution to understanding the implications of the West Florida
Revolt, Steve Belko looks past the posturing and instead focuses
on a critical legacy of the Revolt - the "No Transfer" policy and its
implications for American foreign affairs. According to Belko, the
No Transfer policy "provided the ideological foundations and the
diplomatic justification for future annexation of foreign territory"
by the Americans. Incorporated as an integral ingredient of the
Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the issuance of the No Transfer policy
in 1811 arguably revealed that Manifest Destiny began not in the
1840s but instead barely seven years after the Louisiana Purchase
with Madison's response to the West Florida Revolt. Madison's
decision to dispatch armed forces by both land and sea to seize West
Florida demonstrated America's willingness to adopt expansionist
policies that undoubtedly encouraged later risings against Spanish
authority in Texas, California, and elsewhere.9
9.

American land and sea operations culminated in West Florida with CaptainJohn
Shaw's expedition to suppress lingering discontent along the Tchefuncte River
in March 1811. For descriptions of operations see, John Shaw to Honorable
T. Hamilton, January 3, 1811 , Shaw to Lt. George Merrill, December 30, 1810,
and Shaw to Thomas Cunningham, March 19, 1811 , all in John Shaw Letter
Book, Donald Sharp Collection , SLU; William C. C. Claiborne to Robert Smith ,
December 12, 1810, in Dunbar Rowland (ed.) , Official L etter Books of William
C. C. Claiborne, 1801-1816, 6 vols.Qackson: Mississippi State Department of
Archives and History, 1917) 5:53-6; David Holmes to Robert Smith, January 1,
1811, Clarence E. Carter ( ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United States, 28 vols.
(Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1934-62) 9:913.
For an example of discontent with the American occupation of the territory in
the Feliciana District see, Josiah Lawton to My Dear and Honored Sir, March
10, 1811 ,Josiah Lawton Letters, LLMVC.
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The West Florida Revolt then arguably stimulated a domino effect
of revolution that contributed to freedom from Spanish colonial
authority in much of the western hemisphere. Popular risings led
to a string of independent nations that were each, by one means or
another, incorporated into the United States. Yet whether the West
Florida Republic should actually be considered an independent
nation serves as the focus of Cody Scallions' contribution. As scholars
have begun focusing more intensely on the relevance of the West
Florida Revolt, some skeptics, including many Texans, have cringed
at the thought that there was a Lone Star Republic prior to that
in Texas. Some have questioned the legitimacy of an independent
nation in West Florida. Much of the controversy centers on whether
the West Florida rebels created a viable governmental structure that
enjoyed some popular support in its own right, or whether it existed
merely to facilitate American annexation. 10
Relying on little used sources of primary evidence along with
many long identified sources, Scallions argues that the rebels created
a brief yet sovereign nation sustained by a viable government. As
initial fears of a Spanish counter-strike against the province subsided,
some West Florida officials including the governor, Fulwar Skipwith,
moved away from calls for American annexation, preferring instead
to explore the benefits of independence. William C. C. Claiborne's
arrival at the head of American infantry and naval forces constituted
nothing less than an invasion, in Scallions' analysis, and one of the
first acts of American imperialism.
Policies and actions initiated by the West Florida Convention
suggest that the rebels at least were acting to keep all possibilities
open. As the Convention transitioned into a revolutionary
government, its leaders made clear which colonial land grants
would be honored and which would be nullified. The critical need
for security led the rebels to engage in some expansionist activities
of their own. The actual parameters of the infant republic have
10.

A variety of correspondence reveals the confusion and consternation of some,
including scholars and amateur history buffs alike, concerning the West Florida
Republic. See the email correspondence maintained in the West Florida Revolt
Collection (SLU) dated October 25 and 27, 2004, October 31, 2005, May 24
and 26, 2010; Leroy E. Willie, The West Florida Revolution Controversy: 1810 (selfpublished ms., 2007); New Orleans Times Picayune, May 1, 2005 ; Baton Rouge
Advocate, December 30, 2007. For a scholarly assessment suggesting that the
Republic was merely a transition period to American control see J. C. A. Stagg,
Borderlines in Borderlands: james Madison and the Spanish American Frontier, 17761821 (New Haven: Yale University Press,2009) , 41-54.

Published by STARS, 2011

7

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 90 [2011], No. 2, Art. 3
128

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

long confused history buffs and scholars alike. In the past some
have argued that the republic extended into the modern state of
Florida. Indeed, in Santa Rosa County and more specifically the
town of Milton, Florida, debate still surrounds the moniker "City
Six Flags."
·of
What is the sixth flag displayed in Milton that bears
the lone white star on a field of blue? The truth is the West Florida
rebels would have eagerly embraced the remaining portions ofWest
Florida east of the Pearl River if they could have. As the thoughts
of some rebels turned to the potential value of an independent
nation, their actions revealed the certainty of strength in numbers
and territory. After establishing a bicameral legislature, electing
a governor, suppressing Spanish loyalists, and initiating efforts to
advance their legal authority in the territory between the Mississippi
and Pearl rivers, the West Florida government dispatched a small
army under "Colonel" Reuben Kemper to bring the central Gulf
Coast, including the town of Mobile, under their authority. 11
The rebels had reason to believe that the "Star," as they titled
their cause, enjoyed considerable support east of the Pearl River.
Word had reached Baton Rouge that Anglo settlers in the vicinity
of Fort Stoddert, across the line in the Mississippi Territory north
of Mobile Bay, had formed the "Mobile Society" with the intent to
storm and sack the Spanish fort in that town. True to expectations,
as Kemper's force advanced across the modern Mississippi Gulf
Coast, significant numbers of settlers flocked to join while others,
especially French residents and friends of the Horton family who
had feuded with the Kempers earlier near Pinckneyville, Mississippi,
fled to the Spanish fort at Mobile. 12

11.

Santa Rosa's Press Gazette, April 15 and 19, 201; Official instructions authorizing
Reuben Kemper to proceed east of the Pearl River and induce the inhabitants
there "to support the independence of this Commonwealth," October 11, 1810.
See also entry dated October 10, 1810 in journal of the West Flarida Convention,
1810, West Florida Collection, Library of Congress, hereafter cited as LOC;
Harry Toulrnin to James Madison, November 28,1810, in Carter, The Territnrial
Papers, 4:140-43; Fulwar Skipwith to Joseph Collins, December 4, 1810, in James
A. Padgett, ed., "The West Florida Revolution of 1810 as Told in the Letters of
John Rhea, Fulwar Skipwith, Reuben Kemper, and Others," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly, 21 , no. 1 (January 1938) , 136-7.
12. journal of the West Florida Convention, 1810, October 10, 1810, LOC; Sterling
Dupree to Reuben Kemper and John Gray to Kemper, both November 18,
1810, James A. Padgett (ed.) "The West Florida Revolution," 118; Harry
Toulmin to James Madison, November 28, 1810 and December 6, 1810,
"Petition of Joseph Kennedy for Writ of Habeas Corpus," December 1, 1810,
all in Carter, The Territorial Papers, 4:140-143.
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These residents had good reason to be fearful. Not only was
Kemper known to maintain a "terrifying persona," but also during
the earlier expedition to cow opponents at Springfield, the rebels
had indulged in an "extravagance of brutality." Spanish loyalists
saw their homes burned and stock slaughtered. One Spanish
official report indicated that at least one man had been burned
alive by the rebels. The bulk of their wrath was directed at staunch
Spanish loyalist William Cooper who was known to have pleaded
with the Spanish governor at Pensacola, Vincente Folch, to send
aid to the Loyalists. Although tradition has it that Cooper was
murdered by the rebels, an interpretation included in even the
most recent studies, newly emerging evidence suggests that Cooper
may have only been wounded and cowed into silence by the rebels.
Regardless, Kemper's reputation and the acts of the rebels inspired
fear in the territory. 13
Kemper's aggression and legendary determination had served
him well in earlier efforts to intimidate those in opposition to his
adventures. As his small force advanced into modem-day Alabama,
he encountered perhaps his most formidable opponent in the form
of territorial judge Harry Toulmin. Raised in a Unitarian household
in Somersetshire, England, Toulmin was as highly cultured as he was
educated. Mter coming to America in 1792, he served as secretary
of state in Kentucky from 1796-1804. Appointed federal judge of the
Tombigbee district of the Mississippi Territory in 1804, Toulmin later
crafted the first codified law for Mississippi and Alabama. His term
of service at Fort Stoddert required determination and courage.
In addition to frequent brushes with regional Indians along with
brigands and deserters of many types, he famously arrested Aaron
Burr in 1807 for conspiracy to create an independent state in the

13.

Unsigned, undated official Spanish report that details outrages committed
against Spanish loyalists in the Natalbany River region including the
slaughtering of livestock, destruction of property, and the burning of "Mosen
Rofrey," Papales de Cuba, Legajo 1568, Letter No. 735. The 1820 Spanish
census of Pensacola lists a William Cooper whose birthplace, age, and the
names of his children are consistent with the Spanish loyalist in West Florida.
Moreover, the family tradition of Angela Pope Reid, direct descendant of
Cooper, holds that Cooper was wounded and threatened with death to remain
silent by the rebels before he fled to Pensacola. See Angela Pope Reid Letters,
West Florida Collection, SLU. Harry Toulmin to James Madison, December 6,
1810, in Carter, The TerritorialPapers, 4:149-51. For an example of the inclusion
of Cooper's murder in recent studies see, Davis, The Rngue Republic, 196.
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southwest. In short, he was exactly the type of man the United States
needed on the spot as Kemper's party reached the area.14
When Kemper arrived in November 1810, relations were initially
cordial between the two men. But when Kemper commissioned
Joseph Kennedy, leader of the Mobile Society, as a colonel in his
military force, Toulmin and the American officers at Fort Stoddert
recoiled at the thought of the regional instability such an alliance
would likely initiate. Increasing numbers of local residents eager
to be rid of the exactions required by the Spanish in order to
trade at Mobile, cautiously linked themselves to Kemper. Toulmin,
convinced that if the Spanish were driven from Mobile the British
would seize the territory, came out openly against Kemper's plan for
conquest. When Governor Folch arrived from Pensacola and failed
to stimulate visible support for the Spanish, Kemper concluded
that the mass of residents were eager to support "the Star" and
that only "the villainous exertions of Judge Toulmin, that base
devil filled with deceptive and bloody rascality" prevented a mass
uprising. At a stormy November 25, 1810, meeting with Toulmin,
Kemper advised the judge that he was determined to raise the Star
below the United States territorial line. In response, Toulmin wrote
President Madison that the Mississippi militia, which had been
loyal to the U.S. the previous summer, now sided with Kemper, as
did a majority of the people. He also urged the Spanish at Mobile
to request protection from the United States.15
An American delegation from Fort Stoddert sought to assure
Folch that American citizens participating in filibustering activities
against the Spanish would be punished. In return, Folch promised
to cease levying duties on American goods traded in his district.
Despite such efforts at cooperation, both sides realized that neither
exercised much influence or authority over the West Florida rebels.
14. J.D. Bowers, Peter Hughes, Dan McKanan, and Kathleen Parker, eds.,
Dictionary of Unitarian and Universalist Biography, "Harry Toulmin," http: / I
www25.uua.org/ uuhs/ duub/ articles/ harrytoulmin.html (accessed June 24,
2011); Cox, The WestFlorida Controversy, 176-7,203,461.
15. Harry Toulmin to James Madison, November 28 and December 6, 1810,
"Petition of Joseph Kennedy for Writ of Habeas Corpus, December 1, 1810,
Carter, The Territorial Papers, 4: 140-43, 149-51 , 158-59; Reuben Kemper to John
Rhea, December 16, 1810, Padgett, "The West Florida Revolution," 153; Cox,
The West Florida Controversy, 457-69. Not only was Kemper known to exact brutal
vengeance on those who interfered with his plans, but he was alleged to weigh
more than 200 pounds and to stand more than six feet tall. See James A. Padgett,
ed., "Official Records of the West Florida Revolution and Republic," Louisiana
Historical Quarterly, 21, no. 2, (April1938), 747.
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Indeed, Kemper moved to make clear his independence from
both the Spanish and the Americans. As the American delegation
returned from the meeting with Folch, a rebel patrol intercepted
_them and arrested two messengers from Toulmin accompanying
the delegation as alleged deserters. 16
In an effort to cow local residents into accepting the authority
of the West Florida government, Kemper's men went house to
house about the countryside forcing residents to state their loyalty
amid threats against those opposed to their efforts. When the rebels
learned that American officials north of the line planned to stop a
boat carrying supplies for the West Floridians, Kemper boldly dared
them to try. The rebels established a "moving camp" along the east
bank of Mobile Bay as Kemper frantically wrote Baton Rouge to
forward additional troops. The aggressive activities of the rebels
now made them their own worst enemy. As Kemper's men sought
additional adherents among the population, they inspired more
terror than sympathy. Frustrated, Kemper sent a final insulting
note to Folch, who belatedly moved to confront the rebels. The
moving camp strategy thwarted Folch's initial plan, but now under
pressure, Kemper agreed to a meeting with the Americans and
when he arrived, Toulmin had him arrested. Folch then moved
against Kemper's dwindling army of little more than two dozen
men near Saw Mill Creek. In the ensuing skirmish, two Spaniards
and four rebels were killed and Folch secured seven prisoners as
well as capturing the rebels' supplies and standard, ensuring the
demise of the Lone Star at Mobile. 17
The remnants of the rebel force withdrew toward Pascagoula
where additional supporters of the Star had gathered. This motley
army successfully repulsed and chased a pursuing party of Spaniards
back to Mobile which soothed their pride somewhat and offered a
bit of hope that the cause might yet be viable. While maneuvering
continued west of Mobile, the real coup was taking place along the
Mississippi River. William C. C. Claiborne's arrival at Pointe Coupee,
across the river from the West Florida capital at St. Francisville,
revealed American determination to seize the territory by any means
necessary. Claiborne, at the head of an American force augmented
by the Mississippi Territorial Militia and a five gunboat flotilla under
16. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 4 72-5.
17. John Nicholson to John Rhea, December 17, 1810, Mills and Audibert to
Fulwar Skipwith, December 10, 1810, Padgett, "The West Florida Revolution,
150-2, 154-5; Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 477, 480-4.
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Captain john Shaw, quickly forced the lowering of the Lone Star at
St. Francisville and then advanced on Baton Rouge. As the gunboats
dropped anchor in the river and trained their guns on the fort,
~kipwith, who had promised to die in defense of the Star even if only
twenty men would support him, reluctantly agreed to lower the flag
to prevent a massacre. Thus fell the Lone Star republicP 8
The demise of the West Florida Republic may have been
inglorious, but the implications of its rise and fall were many.
Spanish colonial power was proven weak and unimaginative.
Moreover, even in a region where significant numbers of the
population were known to favor continued association with
Spain, a determined group of filibusters had achieved their goal.
Significantly, the Americans had proven willing to risk provoking
the wrath of international powers by supporting the Revolt, and
even more so by seizing the territory once it had succeeded.
The success of the enterprise also contributed significantly to
the emergence of a more assertive American foreign policy that
ultimately extended to the No Transfer policy and the Monroe
Doctrine, as well as offering a precedent for American imperialism.
Perhaps most significant, the Revolt and its resolution offered a
shining example to the world of the possibilities inherent in such
risk taking. It is no simple coincidence that the modern flag of
Texas bears the lone star. Finally, the Revolt initiated a long
tradition of suspicion of government, and concomitant willingness
to violently resist established authority, that would become the
defining characteristic of much of the territory that fell within
the borders of the fledgling nation. For more than a century after
the Revolt, Louisiana's Florida Parishes would endure some of the
highest rates of rural homicide recorded in American history, all
amid an ineffective and little respected legal system. The research
possibilities connected to the Revolt and its legacy seem boundless.
This edition of the Florida Historical Quarterly seeks to answer
questions and encourage critical thinking about a little publicized
event in American history that carried profound implicationsP 9
18.

19.

Fulwar Skipwith to William C. C. Claiborne, December 10, 1810,John Nicolson
to Rhea, December 17, 1810, Skipwith to John Graham, December 23, 1810,
Skipwith to Constituents,April1, 1811, Padgett, "The West Florida Revolution,"
149-50, 154-5, 156-7; 171-76; John Shaw to Honorable T. Hamilton, January
3, 1811 and Shaw to Lt. George Merrill, December 30, 1810, in John Shaw
Letterbook, SLU.
For discussion of the pattern of violence and contempt for authority that
endured in Louisiana's Florida Parishes see, Hyde, Pistols and Politics.
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